Does an out-of-court statement introduced to prove the truth of the matter constitute hearsay?

An out-of-court statement introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted constitutes hearsay, though it may be admissible if it falls within a hearsay exception and the proponent demonstrates its reliability (see People v. Brensic, 70 N.Y.2d 9, 14, 517 N.Y.S.2d 120, 509 N.E.2d 1226 [1987] ; McCormick on Evidence 246 ). One such

[31 N.Y.3d 1172]

exception is a statement against the declarant's penal interest (see Brensic, 70 N.Y.2d at 14, 517 N.Y.S.2d 120, 509 N.E.2d 1226 ), because "a person ordinarily does not reveal facts that are contrary to [such person's] interest" ( People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 295, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316, 385 N.E.2d 1245 [1978] ). "Declarations against interest are not admitted on the credit of their makers, but on their highly disserving nature," and when it comes to statements against penal interest, "[o]ne thing is clear: the severe sanctions potentially attendant upon a conviction for crime, whether by way of imprisonment or fine or both, make admissions of guilt among the most disserving of declarations" ( id. at 297299, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316, 385 N.E.2d 1245 ).