Does an intoxication instruction on murder second [84 N.Y.2d] degree compel a jury to find a defendant guilty of reckless manslaughter in the first degree?

Likewise, an intoxication instruction on murder second [84 N.Y.2d 633] degree should not compel a trial court to act, in essence and as it were, in a vacuum, and, irrespective of the evidentiary facts, thus allow the jury to decide that a defendant acted recklessly (see, Penal Law 125.15; see also, People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y., at 563, 127 N.E.2d 551, supra ). To propose, as the dissenting opinion does, that this jury--assuming it was ready to acquit defendant of intentional murder--could find this defendant guilty of reckless manslaughter in the second degree, but not be allowed ever to consider intentional manslaughter in the first degree would create its own anomaly. Simply put, an arguable intoxication instruction should not trigger an abstract and absolute command that defies or contradicts the rational and common sense view of the particular evidence as to either lesser manslaughter offense under the circumstances of this case, as further explained below.