The following excerpt is from Gomez v. Sherman, No. 2:17-cv-00305 JAM KJN (E.D. Cal. 2019):
Thus, the admission of the alleged sexual offenses did not violate due process because it is permissible for a jury to infer a petitioner's propensity to commit a sexual offense from prior sexual offenses. See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001) ("courts have routinely allowed propensity evidence in sex-offense cases.... In many American jurisdictions, evidence of a defendant's prior acts of sexual misconduct is commonly admitted in prosecutions for offenses such as rape, incest, adultery, and child molestation"); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1998) (determining that, under Rule 413 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the introduction of prior sexual offenses to demonstrate a defendant's propensity to commit the charged sexual offense does not constitute a violation of due process).
The above passage should not be considered legal advice. Reliable answers to complex legal questions require comprehensive research memos. To learn more visit www.alexi.com.