Does a trial court's comments regarding the scales of justice need to be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?

Second, as to the trial court's comments regarding the "scales of justice," it made those comments while " 'conducting voir dire, not instructing the jury; its comments "were not intended to be, and were not, a substitute for full instructions at the end of trial." ' [Citation.]" (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 716.) Assuming there was no forfeiture despite counsel's failure to object or request an admonition (see People v. Johnson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172), we conclude that any error in the court's discussion of the need for "substantial movement" of the scales of justice was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; compare People v. Johnson, at p. 1172 [court's description of reasonable doubt standard as analogous to decisions made in everyday life trivialized standard in a criminal case, which could not be equated with planning vacations and scheduling flights].)