Does a restitution order constitute a collateral attack under Section 2255 of the Criminal Code?

^[56] Ross, 801 F.3d at 379 (emphasis in original) (quoting Hensley v. Mun. Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)).

^[57] See Dhinsa, 917 F.3d at 77-78.

^[58] See Kaminski v. United States, 339 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[C]ollateral challenges have historically been permitted through habeas only when an interest as compelling as freedom from custody is at stake."); see also United States v. Rutigliano, 887 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding that restitution order did not equate to custodial punishment). Cf. Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that only in the "rare situation" where the "restitution order amounts to a severe restraint on liberty" might a restitution order support a 2255 motion). It may be that, in the event of a successful challenge to a conviction, the defendant will receive the incidental benefit of also eliminating a financial penalty. But that does not change the fact that a challenge to a modest financial penalty or special assessment fee, alone, will not justify a collateral attack under 2255 on a conviction. See Ryan, 688 F.3d at 849 ("A collateral attack under 2241, 2254, or 2255 contests only custody, however, and not fines or special assessments.")