Does a post-trial challenge to a federal grand jury's swearing-in require reversal?

Thus, because this is a posttrial challenge to the grand jury proceedings, any irregularity in the proceedings requires reversal

[245 P.3d 384]

only if defendant has

[51 Cal.4th 158]

been prejudiced. Assuming for the sake of argument that the irregularity violated the federal Constitution, defendant is entitled to relief unless the prosecution can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the irregularity did not affect the outcome of trial. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( Chapman ).) Under state law, defendant bears the burden of demonstrating any error deprived him of a fair trial. (See Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 800, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938.)

[245 P.3d 384]

[51 Cal.4th 158]

Here, defendant is not entitled to relief under either standard. As the trial court noted, the evidence presented to the grand jury after the trial court administered the oath was sufficient to support an indictment against defendant. The belated swearing-in of the grand jurors did not have a structural impact on those proceedings, as the grand jury, once properly sworn, received sufficient evidence to support the indictment.⁸ Contrary to defendant's assertion, the error is susceptible to review for actual prejudice because we can reviewand, indeed, have reviewedthe evidence that was presented to the grand jury after it was sworn. Unlike Vasquez v. Hillery, supra, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598, where racial animus of the grand jurors may have affected their decision in whether and how to charge the defendant, our review of these grand jury proceedings does not require us to speculate as to the jurors' motives. Consequently, we reject his claim that it is impossible to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support his indictment, and we need not consider his claim that the indictment was based at least partly on evidence received prior to jury being sworn.