Does a motorist's mental state make her failure to stop at the scene of the accident reasonable?

made her failure to stop at the scene of the accident reasonable under the circumstances. Defense counsel argued that a motorist must stop at the scene of an injury accident "as promptly as possible under the circumstances" (People v. Odom (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 641, 647) and that those circumstances include the motorist's mental state. Defense counsel told the court: "We are not saying that this is evidence of diminished capacity or insanity or an affirmative defense. . . . [W]e are saying a crime was never committed . . . because . . . the driver must stop his or her vehicle as soon as is reasonably possible under the circumstances" and defendant's "acute stress response . . . required that she goes eight-tenths of a mile until she got a grip of herself and then turned around and came back." The prosecution objected to the proffered evidence. The court ruled that expert testimony on defendant's mental state is irrelevant to the charged offense, a general intent crime and, thus, inadmissible.

On appeal, defendant argues that exclusion of the psychologist's testimony deprived her of her constitutional right to present a defense. (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 18-19.) The Attorney General responds that defendant forfeited the constitutional claim by failing to assert it in the trial court and, in any event, the evidence was properly excluded as irrelevant.

Defendant's contention, whether addressed as a state law or constitutional claim, fails on the merits. "The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person . . . shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene" and present identification and render reasonable assistance to the injured. (Veh. Code, 20001, subd. (a).) " 'The legislative purpose of [the law] is to prevent the driver of a vehicle involved in an injury-causing accident from leaving injured persons in distress and danger for want of medical care and from attempting to avoid possible civil or criminal liability for the accident by failing to identify oneself.' " (People v. Valdez (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 82, 87.)

It is true, as defendant argues, that the law must be given a "reasonable interpretation" and does not "require the driver to do an impossible or useless thing." (People v. Steele (1929) 100 Cal.App. 639, 646.) Thus, a motorist rendered unconscious by a collision is not expected to provide identifying information until he regains

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