Does a minor have to prove his implied waiver of his Miranda rights?

The minor also argues that his implied waiver of rights was both involuntary and unknowing. (Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 130 S.Ct. at pp. 2260-2261.) Although the burden is on the prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's Miranda waiver was voluntary and intelligent (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 751), "[t]he prosecution . . . does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was express. . . . [A] waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.' [Citation.] Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent." (Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 130 S.Ct. at pp. 2261-2262.) In our view, the record in this case demonstrates a voluntary and intelligent Miranda waiver by the minor.