Does a facilitative nexus need to be established to impose a section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement?

^9. People v. Poroj (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 165 did not expressly consider the question, and does not stand for the proposition that there need be no facilitative nexus between the crime and the great bodily injury. The question in Poroj was whether a section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement required a showing of intent to inflict great bodily injury separate or apart from the intent required to commit the underlying felony. People v. Valdez (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 82 does not assist Bloodsaw either. There the defendant's crime was fleeing the scene of an accident in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001. The court concluded that a section 12022.7 enhancement could not be imposed where the defendant's failure to stop and render aid was not the cause of the victim's injuries. (People v. Valdez, supra, at pp. 84-85.) "As the defendant . . . was not committing or attempting to commit a felony at the time of the accident, the injury suffered during the accident was not inflicted in the course of the commission of a felony or attempted felony within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7." (Id. at p. 85.) Valdez does not hold only a temporal nexus is required for imposition of a section 12022.7 enhancement, as Bloodsaw appears to suggest.