Does a defendant have to consent to a defense counsel's strategy of conceding guilt?

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel in his or her defense. (McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 584 U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 1500, 1507].) But while "[t]rial management is the lawyer's province," "[s]ome decisions . . . are reserved for the clientnotably, whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one's own behalf, and forgo an appeal." (Id. at p. ___ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508].) Thus, "[w]hen a client expressly asserts that the objective of 'his defen[s]e' is to

Page 6

maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override it by conceding guilt." (Id. at p. ___ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1509].) But where the defendant has not objected to defense counsel's strategy of conceding guilt in a capital case, the high court has held that no blanket rule demands defendant's explicit consent to a guilt-concession strategy. (Florida v. Nixon (2004) 543 U.S. 175, 181-182, 192 [upholding guilt-concession strategy in a capital case where defendant neither consented nor objected to the strategy].)