Does a defendant have any grounds to argue that there is a widespread misperception among penalty phase jurors that "death means anything other than execution"?

We find no error. First, the record discloses no factual substantiation of defendant's premise. (Cf. People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 681, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351 ["nothing in the record supports the claim of a 'commonplace misunderstanding' that life prisoners are arbitrarily and capriciously released from confinement"].) In People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 696, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351, we observed that in February 1986 "few citizens of the state could have been unaware" of the "strenuous and well publicized campaign" to unseat Chief Justice Bird and two associate justices, which "coalesced around the high percentage of death penalty reversals and the claim that ... this court was intentionally evading the law in refusing to affirm more of those decisions and allow executions to recommence." These comments, which arose in the context of alleged juror misconduct, can hardly serve as empirical support for the proposition that there exists a widespread misperception among penalty phase jurors that "death" means anything other than eventual execution of the defendant. ²³ Moreover, we impliedly concluded that discussion of such matters would not reasonably undermine the jury's sense of the gravity of its task.

[4 Cal.4th 76] Second, and more importantly, defendant's contention is legally untenable. In People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37, the trial court refused to instruct the jury "that if your decision in the penalty phase of this trial, is that the defendant should be put to death, the sentence will be carried out." (Id., at p. 129, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37.) We rejected the defendant's claim of error, concluding, "It is as incorrect to tell the jury the penalty of death or life without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out as it is to suggest they need not take their responsibility as seriously because the ultimate determination of penalty rests elsewhere." (Id., at p. 130, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37.) Such an instruction is simply "not accurate. It ignores the power of the superior court to reduce a sentence of death on review under section 190.4, subdivision (e). It ignores the Governor's

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