Does a court shift the burden of proof in instruction to the jury on recent, unexplained and exclusive possession of stolen property?

Lastly, the defendant in People v. Hutton claims that the trial court shifted the burden of proof in its instruction to the jury on recent, unexplained and exclusive possession of stolen property (see, People v. Moro, 23 N.Y.2d 496, 297 N.Y.S.2d 578, 245 N.E.2d 226). He argues that the court stated on more than one occasion that "the proof shows that the defendant was found in possession of stolen property in the grand larceny within fifteen to twenty minutes of the commission of such crime." As defendant never conceded possession of the car--he instead argued at trial that he was never inside the car--he claims that the court's statements essentially directed the jury to find that he was in the car.

At the time the prosecutor suggested that the court give the jury this particular instruction on recent exclusive possession, defense counsel objected only on the ground that the charge was not appropriate in a stolen car case because of the mobility of the vehicle. At no time did the defendant request any curative or corrective instruction or that the offending language be stricken or removed, except to remark that "there has been a question as to his actual presence in the car." The claim is therefore not preserved for appellate review (CPL 470.35[1]; 470.05[2]; see, People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919).