What is the current state of the law on spousal support for a disabled spouse following a divorce?

At para. 66, the motion judge stated that “illness does not equate to “never-ending” support entitlement”. In the footnote to that statement, he cited Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420 at para. 61. In that paragraph, McLachlin J. (as she then was), in leaving to the trial judge the determination of the quantum of support to be paid to the disabled spouse, did not exclude the possibility that no further support would be required. However, the case in fact stands for the proposition that marriage may well give rise to an obligation to support a disabled spouse indefinitely. She said this, at para. 48: To permit the award of support to a spouse disabled by illness is but to acknowledge the goal of equitably dealing with the economic consequences of marital breakdown that this Court in Moge, supra, recognized as lying at the heart of the Divorce Act. It also may well accord, in my belief, with society's sense of what is just. The Report of the Scottish Law Commission, Family Law: Report on Aliment and Financial Provision (1981), at pp. 111-12, a thoughtful analysis of the rationale and policy considerations of spousal support and illness, states: Financial provision on divorce is not . . . simply a matter of abstract principle. It is essential that any system should be acceptable to public opinion and it is clear from the comments we have received that many people would find it hard to accept a system which cut off, say, an elderly or disabled spouse with no more than a three-year allowance after divorce, no matter how wealthy the other party might be. Divorce ends the marriage. Yet in some circumstances the law may require that a healthy party continue to support a disabled party, absent contractual or compensatory entitlement. Justice and considerations of fairness may demand no less.