Is an accused denied the opportunity to make a full answer and defence if he is precluded from relying on either general reputation or specific sexual encounters?

Is an accused denied the opportunity of making full answer and defence if he is precluded from relying on either category of evidence for either of the two purposes mentioned above? It is somewhat instructive at this juncture to examine the position at common law. At common law, it was thought that evidence of specific sexual encounters by the complainant was not relevant to any matter directly in issue, but pertained only to the complainant's credibility. This characterization is inherent in the rule described in Laliberte v. The Queen (1877) 1877 CanLII 24 (SCC), 1 S.C.R. 117 to the effect that a complainant in a rape trial could be questioned during cross-examination as to specific sexual encounters she had experienced, but the accused was bound by her answer (if she chose to answer) and therefore could not call independent evidence to contradict her. This is a standard application of the collateral issue doctrine. Among the exceptions to this rule was evidence of specific sexual encounters by the complainant with the accused, which it was thought was relevant to the issue of consent. However, evidence of the complainant's reputation for unchastity received different treatment at common law. Such evidence was considered relevant not only to credibility, but to the issue of consent as well. Consequently, the collateral issue doctrine did not apply to general reputation evidence.