How have the words “subject to 75% co-insurance” been interpreted in a fire insurance policy?

In dealing with this case, I think—in view of the decision of this court in Wanless v. Lancashire Ins. Co. (1896), 23 A.R. 224—we must treat the co-insurance clause as a condition, and therefore as a variation of the statutory conditions to which all contracts of fire insurance are subject. Indeed by inserting it among the additional conditions the defendants have made it impossible for us to deal with it otherwise than as a condition. We cannot treat it as having any other place in the policy. I do not think any special weight is to be attached to the presence of the words “subject to 75% co-insurance” upon the face of the policy, especially having regard to their position. They cannot be looked upon as doing more than drawing attention to the condition, which had already been done by the statement previously made in the policy that the insurance was subject to the terms and conditions thereinafter mentioned. Nor do I think that it ought to be inferred that from seeing these words and reading the co-insurance clause or condition the plaintiffs were informed that the defendants were effecting insurances upon other terms and at other rates than those shewn in the policy.