Does the doctrine of nunc pro tunc apply to the cases at bar?

I must now decide whether the doctrine applies to the cases at bar. Before doing so, I should briefly outline the applicable standard of review. The standard that ordinarily applies to a judge’s discretionary decision on whether to grant an order nunc pro tunc is that of deference: if the judge has given sufficient weight to all the relevant considerations, an appellate court must defer to his or her exercise of discretion (Reza v. Canada, 1994 CanLII 91 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 394, at page 404). However, if the judge’s discretion is exercised on the basis of an erroneous principle, an appellate court is entitled to intervene: Soulos v. Korkontzilas, 1997 CanLII 346 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 54 [Soulos]. In CIBC, Strathy J. found that he did not have jurisdiction to make the order nunc pro tunc. It follows that he did not actually exercise any discretion, and there is therefore no decision to defer to. But, even if he had done so, his reasoning on whether the order should be granted nunc pro tunc was based on an erroneous principle in that he conflated the doctrine of nunc pro tunc with that of special circumstances and erroneously concluded that an order can be made nunc pro tunc only in the event of a slip or oversight. His decision is therefore not entitled to deference on appeal.