Can only "slight evidence" be used in a criminal case?

Defendant argues allowing only "slight" corroboration reduces the prosecution's burden of proof to a level below beyond a reasonable doubt. Not so. "[T]he inference that possession of stolen property creates is permissive, not mandatory. The case law is settled that requiring only slight corroborating evidence in support of a permissive inference, like the one that possession of stolen property creates, neither changes the prosecution's burden of proving every element of the offense nor otherwise violates the right of due process if, as here, the conclusion suggested is one that common sense and reason can justify `in light of the proven facts before the jury.' [Citations.] [] The permissive inference that CALCRIM No. 376 authorizes if the jury finds slight supporting evidence is linguistically synonymous with, and constitutionally indistinguishable from, the permissive inference that CALJIC No. 215 authorizes if the jury finds slight corroborating evidence. CALJIC No. 2.15 has withstood repeated constitutional attack. [Citations.] Like CALJIC No. 2.15, CALCRIM No. 376 neither undermines the presumption of innocence nor violates due process." (People v. Solorzano, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1035-1036.)

Defendant relies on federal cases which found a "slight evidence" instruction constitutionally defective. (See United States v. Gray (5th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 494, 500 and United States v. Hall (5th Cir. 1976) 525 F.2d 1254, 1255-1256.) He contends this court must follow federal constitutional law on this point rather than state law.