Can communications to an attorney who is not an attorney be privileged?

communications to an attorney who is transacting business that might have been transacted by another agent who is not an attorney [citation]. [] Since [the company's] labor negotiations could have been conducted by a non-attorney, it is self-evident that communications with [the attorney] relating to the conduct of those negotiations were not privileged . . . ." (Id. at p. 32; see Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 297 ["In order for a communication to be privileged, it must be made for the purpose of the legal consultation, rather than some unrelated or ancillary purpose."].)

These principles were applied in the context of the mandatory provisions for relief from default in Gutierrez v. G & M Oil Co., Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 551. There, a lawyer for the defendant company was also a vice-president and the registered agent for service of process. The company was sued, and the lawyer decided to take on the defense himself without informing anyone else at the company. He appeared for at least two case management conferences, but otherwise neglected the case, and eventually a default and default judgment were entered. (Id. at pp. 555-556.) The principal issue in the case was whether in-house counsel qualified for mandatory relief. The court held they do. (Id. at p. 554.) But in analyzing the issue, the court recognized that not all activity by a corporate lawyer qualifies for relief: "There is a distinction between corporate counsel who provide 'strictly legal services' to a corporation, and corporate counsel who 'step out' of their role as 'legal advisor' and provide services of a 'nonlegal business nature.'" (Id. at p. 555.) The court held that the conduct at issue in that case was legal in nature because the attorney was representing the company in court, a quintessential legal activity. (Id. at p. 564.)