Can an attorney or solicitor under section 3256 of the Code of Civil Procedure include a disbursement in their bill of costs?

comprehended in any of the particular services specified in the act; and unless it comes within some one of the services provided for by the act, it cannot be taxed; thus showing that in the opinion of the court at that time nothing could be taxed except what was particularly specified in the act. In Hovey v. Hovey, 5 Paige, 551, it was held that the solicitor was not entitled to have taxed the expense of ascertaining the residence of the defendants as a necessary disbursement, and that the only disbursements which were properly taxable under the provisions in the fee-bill were disbursements by the solicitor for postage, for exemplifications to be used in the suit, for necessary searches in the public offices, for the publication of notices required by law or the practice of the court, and other disbursements of a like nature. The chancellor said: There are many cases of disbursements by an attorney or solicitor for the benefit of his client, which are not taxable against the adverse party as costs in the cause, but which form a proper [125 N.Y. 110]subject of allowance to the attorney or solicitor as against his own client. Section 3256 of the Code of Civil Procedure now specifies the disbursements which a party entitled to costs may include in his bill, and it is as follows: A party to whom costs are awarded in an action is entitled to include in his bill of costs his necessary disbursements, as follows: The legal fees of witnesses, and of referees and other officers; the reasonable compensation of commissioners taking depositions; the legal fees for publication, where publication is directed, pursuant to law; the legal fees paid for a certified copy of a deposition or other paper recorded or filed in any public office, necessarily used or obtained for use on the trial; the reasonable expenses of printing the papers for a hearing, when required by a rule of the court; prospective charges for the expenses of entering and docketing the judgment, and the sheriff's fees for receiving and returning one execution thereon, including the search for property; and such other reasonable and necessary expenses as are taxable according to the course and practice of the court, or by express provision of law. There is certainly nothing in this section which authorizes the taxation of this item, unless it be the last clause; and thus we are brought to the inquiry whether the item is taxable according to the course and practice of the court, or by express provision of law. We are pointed to no express provision of law, and the sole inquiry, therefore, is whether it is taxable according to the course and practice of the court. The supreme court, which must be presumed to be familiar with its own practice, holds that it is not thus taxable. This the court could have determined from its own knowledge, without any other evidence. But its decision is amply supported by the evidence placed before it, and we can perceive no ground upon which we can reverse it. We are not presumed to know as well as that court the practice which prevails therein in such cases.