Can a section of an ordinance that prohibits the possession of firearms on county property refer only to gun shows?

Significantly, this case is not one in which we are asked to enforce an independent provision in an ordinance after severing a preempted provision. (See, e.g., Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 292, 219 Cal.Rptr. 467, 707 P.2d 840.) Rather, the provision that the majority enforcesthe prohibition against possessing firearms on county property is the same provision that conflicts with state law. Nor is this a case where the ordinance is ambiguous and might be construed narrowly so as to avoid preemption problems. (See, e.g., In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 220, fn. 18, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992.) No one could reasonably construe a general prohibition against firearm possession to refer only to gun shows, and no one reading the ordinance without the benefit of a law degree and a careful study of our decisions would guess that the ordinance merely refers to gun shows.