Can a refiled action be treated as a continuation of a dismissed action?

To the contrary, we must give effect to the plain meaning of the statutes. (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) Penal Code section 1382 commands that, absent good cause to do otherwise, the court "shall order the action to be dismissed" when it is not brought to trial within the required time. Penal Code section 1384, by its mandate to discharge the defendant from custody if the judge directs dismissal of the action, tells us this dismissal is real. Penal Code section 1387 provides that an "order terminating an action" pursuant to these statutes is a bar to any other prosecution under the circumstances described. Penal Code section 1387.2 tells us that, "[u]pon the express consent of both the people and the defendant, in lieu of issuing an order terminating an action the court may proceed on the existing accusatory pleading," in which event a new time period commences. In our view, a finding that the refiled case was but a continuation of the terminated case would be tantamount to a somewhat oxymoronic "compelled express consent" under Penal Code section 1387.2. Although it appears obvious that a genuine stipulation according to the terms authorized by Penal Code section 1387.2 would mean there was only one case (since nothing would be dismissed, nothing refiled), that issue is not now before us and we do not decide it. We do opine, however, that there would have been no need, in 1992, to enact Penal Code section 1387.2 if a refiled case could be treated as a continuation of a dismissed case. (Stats. 1992, ch. 278, 2, p. 1110.)⁸