Can a jury still convict a defendant of sexual penetration of a child even if it concluded that he may not have deliberately penetrated the victim's anus?

Defendant also claims that he was prejudiced because the jury was instructed that the People must prove that he "participated in," as opposed to "committed," an act of sexual penetration, and as a result, could have found defendant guilty of the offense even if it concluded that he "may not have deliberately penetrated the victim's anus." We are not persuaded. As detailed above, the jury was instructed more than once that "[s]exual penetration means penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of the other person for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification." (Italics added.) Thus, the jury was instructed that sexual penetration, by definition is a purposeful act, and one which cannot be done inadvertently. As we recently explained in People v. ZarateCastillo (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1167, "The crime of sexual penetration of a child 10 years old or younger and the crime of forcible sexual penetration are both specific intent crimes because they require the act of penetration 'to be done with the intent to gain sexual arousal or gratification or to inflict abuse on the victim.' (People v. McCoy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1541 [addressing forcible sexual penetration]; see Pen. Code, 289, subd. (k)(1).)" (Fn. omitted.) In that case we found that the trial court's error in informing the jury that the crimes of sexual penetration of a child and forcible sexual penetration are general intent crimes was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because "the trial court went on to instruct the jury that to be guilty of each of those crimes, defendant must have committed the act of penetration for the purpose of sexual

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