Can a jury conclude that defendant committed the proscribed act of engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim against her will by holding a gun to her head?

These wholly divergent accounts create no middle ground from which the jury could conclude that defendant committed the proscribed act of engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim against her will by holding a gun to her head, but lacked criminal intent because, for example, he honestly and reasonably, but mistakenly, believed she voluntarily had consented. (People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961.) On the evidence presented, the primary issue for the jury to determine was whether defendant forced the complaining witness to engage in sexual intercourse by placing a gun to her head. No reasonable juror considering this evidence could have concluded that defendant committed the acts alleged by the complaining witness, but lacked the requisite intent to commit rape.

"Evidence of uncharged offenses 'is so prejudicial that its admission requires extremely careful analysis. [Citations.]' ... 'Since "substantial prejudicial effect [is] inherent in [such] evidence," uncharged offenses are admissible only if they have substantial probative value.' [Citation.]" (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. ----, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 660, 867 P.2d at p. 771, italics in original.)

Defendant's plea of not guilty put in issue all of the elements of the offenses, including his intent (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, [7 Cal.4th 423] 857-858, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906), and evidence that defendant committed uncharged similar offenses would have some relevance regarding defendant's intent in the present case. But, because the victim's testimony that defendant placed a gun to her head, if believed, constitutes compelling evidence of defendant's intent, evidence of defendant's uncharged similar offenses

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