Can a jury be found guilty of prejudicial misconduct by discussing the prospect of a hung jury and consequent retrial at which minor witnesses might again have to testify?

Senter first asserts that the jury committed prejudicial misconduct by discussing during deliberations the prospect of a hung jury and consequent retrial at which the minor witnesses might again have to testify. "'[W]hen misconduct involves the receipt of information from extraneous sources, the effect of such receipt is judged by a review of the entire record, and may be found to be nonprejudicial. The verdict will be set aside only if there appears a substantial likelihood of juror bias. . . .' [Citation.]" (People v. Danks, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 303.) A substantial likelihood of juror bias exists "'if the extraneous material, judged objectively, is inherently and substantially likely to have influenced the juror.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) "'[E]ven if the extraneous information was not so prejudicial, in and of itself, as to cause "inherent" bias . . .,' the nature of the misconduct and the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the misconduct must still be examined to determine objectively whether a substantial likelihood of actual bias nonetheless arose.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)