Can a driver or owner of a vehicle be held criminally liable for allowing another person to discharge a firearm from the vehicle?

Section 26100, subdivision (b), imposes criminal liability on "[a]ny driver or owner of any vehicle, whether or not the owner of the vehicle is occupying the vehicle, who knowingly permits any other person to discharge any firearm from the vehicle ...." The constitutionality of its exactly worded statutory predecessor, section 12034, subdivision (b), was challenged in People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1466-1467. (See Stats. 2010, ch. 711, 4.) In concluding subdivision (b) was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness, the court noted this section applies to a defined class of persons who have a duty to act: drivers and owners of vehicles; it imposes a legal duty on such drivers and owners to prevent the discharge of firearms from their vehicles. (People v. Laster, supra, at p. 1467.) Pursuant to the statute's language, the court observed a driver or owner can be held criminally liable for "affirmatively assenting to[] or authorizing the discharge; but he or she can also be held criminally liable for failing to prevent the discharge (provided, of course, he or she had the power or ability to prevent it)." (Ibid.) By its plain language, the statute imposes criminal liability "only where the driver or owner 'knowingly' permits the discharge." (Ibid.) As such, to find a defendant guilty of permitting another person to discharge a weapon from a vehicle pursuant to section 26100, subdivision (b), the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant was the driver or owner of the vehicle; (2) the defendant permitted someone to shoot a firearm from the vehicle; (3) the defendant knew that he or she was permitting someone to shoot a firearm from the vehicle; and (4) the other person shot the firearm from the vehicle. ( 26100, subd. (b); CALCRIM No. 969.)

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