Can a district attorney argue that the ordinance in question is not an obscenity law?

[147 Cal.App.3d 497] The district attorney asserts the ordinance in question is not an obscenity law, but is instead a regulation of the "time, place, and manner" of exhibiting films. It is settled that a municipality has the general power to regulate commercial business where the regulation is reasonable and nondiscriminatory. (People v. Glaze (1980) 27 Cal.3d 841, 845, 166 Cal.Rptr. 859, 614 P.2d 291.) However, where the ordinance involved is not uniformly applicable to all commercial enterprises and involves restrictions on activities protected by the First Amendment, ³ then the government bears the burden of showing that the regulation is narrowly and explicitly drawn and necessary to further a legitimate governmental interest. (Id., at pp. 845-846, 166 Cal.Rptr. 859, 614 P.2d 291.) By conceding that this case is not concerned with obscene films the district attorney necessarily also concedes that the films involved are entitled to full First Amendment protection. (Morris v.

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