Can a defendant's statement in a probation officer's report be used to establish that he stabbed the victim to death?

Noting "[t]he prosecution could not have compelled defendant to testify, and thus could not have used defendant's subsequent admission that he stabbed the victim to convict him," and "[o]nce the court accepted his plea, defendant could admit to the probation officer having stabbed the victim without fear of prosecution, because he was clothed with the protection of the double jeopardy clause from successive prosecution for the same offense" (People v. Trujillo, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 179), Trujillo concluded "[b]arring the use of a defendant's statement reflected in a probation officer's report . . . is consistent with [the] rule . . . that in determining the nature of a prior conviction, the court may look to the entire record of the conviction, `but no further.' [Citation.] The reason for this limitation [is] to `effectively bar[ ] the prosecution from relitigating the circumstances of a crime committed years ago and thereby threatening the defendant with harm akin to double jeopardy and denial of speedy trial.' [Citation.] Permitting a defendant's statement made in a postconviction probation officer's report to be used against him to establish the nature of the conviction would present similar problems, creating harm akin to double jeopardy and forcing the defendant to relitigate the circumstances of the crime." (Id. at p. 180.)