Can a defendant prevail on a direct aiding of the target offense of second degree murder?

^3. We agree with the Attorney General that defendant could not prevail on the first kind of aider liability, direct aiding of a target offense of second degree murder, because logically he could not intend to aid an implied malice murder. (Cf. People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 [a direct aider must act "with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense"].) Only the second form of aider liability, triggering the natural and probable consequences doctrine, could apply.

^4. We will assume for purposes of argument that a defense attorney can request such an instruction but do not decide whether such a duty arises only when the prosecutor seeks such instruction, as the Attorney General argues. (Cf. People v. Huynh, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 678 [declining to reach whether duty to instruct arises where defense counsel makes the request for instruction on target offenses].)