Can a defendant be held criminally responsible as an accomplice not only for the crime he intended to do but also for any other crime that is a natural and probable consequence of the target crime?

"[A] defendant may be held criminally responsible as an accomplice not only for the crime he or she intended to aid and abet (the target crime), but also for any other crime that is the `natural and probable consequence' of the target crime." (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261.) The same principle applies under the law of conspiracy for the acts of a coconspirator. (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 188.)

"In determining whether the crime committed by a confederate was the natural and probable consequence of a crime aided and abetted by the defendant, the inquiry is strictly objective, and does not depend on the defendant's state of mind as to the confederate's crime. . . . `[T]he issue . . . depends upon whether, under all of the circumstances presented, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have or should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted by the defendant.' [Citation.]" (People v. Caesar (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1058.)