Can a defendant be convicted of second degree felony murder where there is no law specifically criminalizing the crime at the time of the crime?

in essence, whether a matter should be criminalized. The logical consequence of such caselaw policymaking is that the criminal law could change if the next party does a better job of marshaling the real-world evidence. This possibility underscores the serious constitutional vagueness problem. Remarkably, in our prior decision on methamphetamine manufacture as a predicate, this court even acknowledged that new expert testimony offered in a subsequent case can change the status of a predicate offense. (See People v. James , supra , 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 263, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 7 ["Once a published appellate opinion holds a felony is (or is not) inherently dangerous, that precedent is controlling, unless and until a litigant makes an offer of proof that technological changes have changed the status of the felony "], italics added.) Thus, apparently not only could a defendant be convicted of second degree felony murder where there was no law expressly including his crime at the time of his offense, but he could even be convicted if the law was squarely on his side, but the prosecution put on a better showing of statistical evidence and expert testimony in the next case. I believe this possibility is obviously anathema to the due process concept of fair notice, and it is one illustration of the particular problem with having courts take evidence in individual cases to determine what crimes qualify as second degree felony-murder predicates.