California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Olea, 59 Cal.App.4th 1289, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 722 (Cal. App. 1997):
We cannot agree with this line of argument either. In view of the express notification in the complaint that conviction of the offenses alleged in counts 6 and 7 would require sex offender registration, appellant could reasonably believe that dismissal of those counts would eliminate the basis for registration. When he entered his plea, the court inquired only about his intent to commit theft, not about sexual compulsion or gratification. While appellant agreed the sex offenses were transactionally related to the thefts and could be considered for sentencing purposes, the record reflects his counsel's belief that such consideration would be directed to the degree of punishment to be imposed within the range contemplated by the plea bargain, not to the imposition of an entirely different element of punishment. (See People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758, 159 Cal.Rptr. 696, 602 P.2d 396.) Counsel objected immediately when the sentencing court broached the subject of sex offender registration under section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(E). Under the circumstances of this case, counsel's view of the agreement was not unreasonable, nor would it be unreasonable for appellant to expect that one of the benefits of his plea bargain was avoiding the necessity of registering as a sex offender.
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