Can a clerk enter a judgment for attorney's fees on a promissory note?

As pointed out in Lynch v. Bencini (1941) 17 Cal.2d 521, 110 P.2d 662, the clerk may not enter judgment where evidence is necessary to disclose the correct amount nor when discretion must be exercised. No such situation existed in the case

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The cases cited by plaintiff are not in point. In Farrar v. Steenbergh (1916) 173 Cal. 94, 159 P. 707, the clerk entered a default judgment on a cross-complaint charging fraud, which judgment ordered a note and mortgage cancelled, [235 Cal.App.2d 432] rescinded a sale of real property, and return of the downpayment on the sale. Obviously such a judgment was beyond the power of the clerk.

In Kittridge v. Stevens (1860) 16 Cal. 381, although the court expressed without discussion some doubt on the authority of the clerk to enter default judgment on a promissory note in an action seeking to declare a lien upon real property for the amount of the note, the court did not pass upon the validity of the clerk's judgment, saying that its validity was not being questioned.

Landwehr v. Gillette (1917) 174 Cal. 654, 163 p. 1018, held that the clerk has no authority to enter a judgment for attorney's fees on a promissory note providing for reasonable attorney's fees because the determination of what are reasonable attorney's fees is a judicial and not a ministerial matter.

The clerk's judgment here was solely one for a money judgment and not for foreclosure.

2. The contingent fee agreement.