Can a capital defendant waive his right to be personally present at trial?

In relevant part, section 977 provides that "[i]n all cases in which a felony is charged, the accused shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence." ( 977, subd. (b)(1).) Notwithstanding the unqualified command of section 977 that a felony defendant be personally present at trial, section 1043 permits a trial which commenced with the defendant's presence to proceed in the defendant's absence in certain specified cases, including "[a]ny prosecution for an offense which is not punishable by death in which the defendant is voluntarily absent." ( 1043, subd. (b)(2).) We recently construed these provisions in People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1211, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, concluding that, in light of the plain statutory language, a capital defendant cannot voluntarily waive his personal presence at the proceedings enumerated in section 977. (People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1211, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) Applying People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, the court in Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pages 738-739, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485, found the defendant's waiver of personal presence at a crime scene view that included the taking of testimony constituted statutory error, albeit nonprejudicial error.