Are there any cases that support a police officer's interpretation of a defendant's Miranda right to remain silent?

defendant were spontaneous or the result of post-invocation interrogation. (See People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 437, 442 [noting that after officer advised defendant of his Miranda rights, "[d]efendant stated he would not waive his rights and signed the admonition form so indicating," and finding that defendant's subsequent confession "was not spontaneous or volunteered, but rather the product of the 'functional equivalent' of interrogation"]; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1025, 1035-1037 [noting that after police "informed defendant of his Miranda rights . . . [and] asked, 'Do you wish to give up the right to remain silent?' " defendant replied, " 'No. I want my lawyer,' " and finding that subsequent questioning of defendant was interrogational].)

The third case, People v. Peracchi (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 353, is inapposite because there the court found that the officer's follow up questions to defendant's statement " ' "I don't think I can talk," ' " clearly evidenced that the officer acknowledged that the defendant had invoked his right to remain silent and that he was asking him why he had invoked his rights. (Id. at pp. 358, 361 ["the questions here were not directed at whether [the defendant] was invoking his right to silence . . . . Instead, the questions asked why he did not wish to waive his rights. This inquiry itself assumes that [the defendant] had invoked his right to remain silent. Officers have no legitimate need or reason to inquire into the reasons why a suspect wishes to remain silent."].) In other words, none of these cases shed light on the specific issue herethe effect of language like "I think" and "probably" on a reasonable officer's interpretation of whether a defendant is invoking his Miranda rights.

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